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We study equilibrium selection by cheap talk in symmetric 2£2 coordination
games. Before playing the game, players exchange simultaneously messages com-
ing from a …nite set. The messages have no a priori meaning. Individuals from a
single population are matched in a round robin fashion to play the game. They
update startegies by imitating the currently most succesful individuals. When
risk dominance selects a di¤erent equilibrium than payo¤ dominance, the game
outcome of a stochastically stable state depends on the number of messages in the
message set. For su¢ciently many messages, the e¢cient equilibrium is played.
We link the bound on the message set size to the payo¤ structure of the game.
JEL Classi…cation Number: C720, D830.
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1 Introduction
Introducing payo¤ irrelevant strategies into a game does not destroy the existing equi-
libria, therefore cheap talk per se does not select equilibria from the equilibrium set
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of the game without communication. It rather creates new equilibria that are payo¤
equivalent to the existing ones, and supported by di¤erent beliefs about the meaning
of the messages. Does cheap talk give evolutionary support to the play of the e¢cient
equilibria?
In this paper, we address the evolution of communication via cheap talk in 2 £ 2 sym-
metric coordination games. We link the evolution of meaningful messages to the payo¤
structure of the game and extend hereby the equilibrium selection in evolutionary games
studied by Kandori, Mailath and Rob [13] (henceforth KMR) in the presence of cheap
talk communication.
There have been identi…ed in the literature conditions under which adding cheap talk
selects e¢cient outcomes in evolutionary models. Common interest1 in two player games
has been found su¢cient and necessary condition in multi-population models with best
response dynamics, or static solution concepts based on the Nash equilibrium concept.
Sobel [24] …rst showed that for …nite two-player games with common interest, for every
e¢cient outcome there is a strategy pro…le supporting this outcome in the evolutionary
stable set. Matsui [16] introduced a set valued concept, cyclically stable set2. In [17],
he shows for the class of 2£2 common interest games in a two population scenario that
CSS contains only states yielding the e¢cient equilibrium.
The multipopulation modelling is a crucial assumption. Schlag [23] shows that with two-
population replicator dynamics, common interest is necessary and su¢cient for e¢cient
stable outcomes. With one population dynamics, common interest implies that e¢cient
outcomes are stable, but ine¢cient evolutionary stable strategies may persist.
The most general result for a multipopulation dynamics is presented by Kim and Sobel
[15]. Two …nite populations play asymmetric n£n game. The strategy updating process
followed by the individuals is rather restrictive. At any occasion, a single individual is
given the opportunity to change the current strategy for a strategy that weakly improves
upon this strategy. Any better performing strategy is chosen with positive probability.
Strategy updates continue even if all strategies perform equally well, in order to avoid
lock in suboptimal states.
Under this dynamics, two-sided communication leads to the e¢cient outcome in games
1Denote by ei the maximal payo¤ player i can achieve in the underlying game G, i.e. ei =
maxsi;sj ¼i(si;sj); where ¼i(si;sj) is the payo¤ to player i when he chooses strategy si and the other
player chooses strategy sj: Game G is a game of common interest if ¼i(si;sj) = ei ) ¼j(sj;si) = ej.
2A collection of strategies forms a cyclically stable set (CSS) if it is a set closed under the best
response dynamics, and any two members of CSS are mutually accessible by a path generated by the
best response dynamics in CSS.3
with common interest. For general games, all e¢cient outcomes recur in…nitely often.
One-sided communication always leads to the preferred outcome of the player sending
the message, if it is part of a strict Nash equilibrium.
Kim and Sobel [15] consider an environment without mistakes or mutations, and there-
fore cannot address two important aspects: e¤ect of noise in communication, and the
role of simultaneous strategy adjustments. The …rst issue is handled by Bhaskar [3], the
second by Blume [4].
Bhaskar [3] considers noisy communication in …nite, possibly asymmetric games, played
as a truly asymmetric contest. With a strictly positive probability, the message received
by a player does not coincide with the message sent by the other player. The exchanged
messages are thus not common knowledge, and successful strategies have to be resistant
to the noise. When allowing countably in…nitely many messages, a noise robust Nash
equilibrium, a limit of Nash equilibria in games with the noise level converging to zero,
is e¢cient.
Blume [4] assumes that members of two populations update strategies simultaneously
according to a best response dynamics with incomplete sampling from the currently
used strategies. With one-sided communication, the author …nds an upper bound on
the message set size so that communication is e¤ective in selecting the preferred outcome
of the sender population as the only outcome in the set closed under best responses. If
the risk measure of the preferred equilibrium increases, the minimal required number of
messages increases as well. In 2 £ 2 symmetric games, the appropriate risk measure is
Harsanyi and Selten’s risk dominance.
With both-sided communication, Blume …nds no upper bound on message set size con-
nected to the risk of the preferred equilibrium of senders, so that the e¢cient outcome
is stable under the evolutionary best response dynamics. When the symmetry of the
messages is broken, the e¢ciency result is recovered. In particular, Blume assumes that
for any strict Nash equilibrium in the underlying game, there is one message exogenously
linked to it. If players exchange the messages linked to that equilibrium, an individual
linking the message to the equilibrium receives a small additional payo¤ boost. Hence,
a priori information content is assigned to particular messages in an equilibrium. The
payo¤ boosts exclude the possibility of an unrestricted drift. Once the e¢cient equilib-
rium is played. players are locked in using the message connected to that equilibrium.
E¢ciency is achieved disregarding the message space size and risk.
We introduce a few important relaxations compared to Kim and Sobel [15] and Blume
[4]. Players are allowed to update their strategies simultaneously. Strategies performing4
worse in the current population than the present strategies can enter the population via
mutations. We study two-sided communication, but do not restrict the meaning of the
messages. While Blume [4] uses the assumption that players ”recognize” meaningful
communication if the messages form a strict Nash equilibrium, we let the players who
behave according to this assumption compete with players who ignore the messages
and players who use di¤erent messages to ”recognize” the same equilibrium. Hence, the
communicating individuals we consider behave as if the messages had some pre-speci…ed
a priori information content, and we study under which conditions these individuals
survive the pressure of the imitation dynamics. There is no payo¤ boost connected to
any message/strategy combination.
The adaptation dynamics is driven by imitation. Moreover, we choose a single-population
evolutionary dynamics, in order to be able to confront selection criteria based on risk
with the presence of cheap talk communication.
The time runs in discrete steps, and in one period, an individual is randomly re-matched
in a round robing fashion to play the game against all other individuals in the population.
Each individual is preprogrammed to play a …xed strategy during one time period. At
the end of any period, all individuals imitate the most successful strategies, that earned
the highest average payo¤ in that period. Occasionally, an individual makes a mistake
and chooses another strategy.
The one shot game consists of a communication stage and actual strategy choice in the
coordination game. In the communication stage, both players send simultaneously a
message from the message set. A strategy of an individual is the message sent in the
communication stage, and a map from the exchanged message pair to the action set of
the 2 £ 2 coordination game.
We restrict the set of strategies to fully ”communicating” and ”not communicating”
strategies. A strategy is a fully communicating strategy if it assigns probability one
to one message in the communication stage, and it conditions the action taken in the
underlying game on the sent and received messages. In particular, a communicating
strategy assigns in the underlying game probability one to the action corresponding to
the payo¤ dominant equilibrium whenever the message received in the communication
stage is the same as the message sent. Otherwise, a communicating strategy assigns in
underlying game probability one to the action corresponding to the payo¤ dominated
equilibrium.
Hence, a communicating strategy, prescribing to sent message m in the communication
stage, leads to behavior that can be interpreted in the following way. Individual using5
such a strategy behaves as if the message m indicates the intention to play the payo¤
dominant equilibrium and all individuals in the population share the belief that message
m indicates the intention to play the payo¤ dominant equilibrium.
A strategy is not communicating if it assigns a positive probability to any message in the
communication stage, and it does not condition the action taken in the underlying game
on the sent and received messages. This amounts to ”babbling” in the communication
stage.
We assume that an individual cannot recognize the strategy of the individual he is
matched to. The babbling of the noncommunicating individuals therefore creates noise
for the ”communicating” individuals. The ”as if” type of behavior of an individual using
a communicating strategy when matched to an individual using a noncommunicating
strategy may lead to an out-of-equilibrium play.
We show that under these conditions, the stochastically stable states do not always
lead to the play of the risk dominant equilibrium, as it is in the model without com-
munication. For coordination games where the risk dominant equilibrium is not payo¤
dominant, there are games where the message set with two messages is large enough
for the communicating player type to turn the population dynamics towards the play of
the e¢cient equilibrium in the long run, but also games where the number of messages
must be considerably higher to achieve this e¤ect. We are able to link the noise in the
communication stage, represented by the number of messages in the message set, and
riskiness of the payo¤ dominant equilibrium to the e¢cient equilibrium play in the long
run. In particular, we show that when the message space is small, the result of KMR
prevails and the ine¢cient equilibrium will be played in the long run if it is risk domi-
nant. Otherwise, e¢cient equilibrium play will be the long run outcome. Increasing the
number of messages makes the survival of communicating strategies more likely. This
is in contrast to Kim and Sobel’s [15] results based on gradual evolutionary dynamics,
where there is no connection between the message set size and stability of communi-
cation as soon as the message set contains at least two messages, or Blume’s [4] result
where messages are assigned meaning exogenously.
In order to assess the importance of the uniform babbling assumption, we also investigate
a model restricting the message set to two messages such that one message is more
informative in the sense of being used with lower probability by the noncommunicating
individuals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model




Figure 1: The underlying game G
set consists of at least two messages and noncommunicating players babble uniformly.
We identify the set of long run outcomes of the imitation dynamics depending on the
number of messages in the message set. In Section 4, we restrict the message set to two
messages and consider noncommunicating strategies that use one of the messages with
a smaller probability than the other message. Hence, we introduce exogenously some
asymmetry into the message set. Both in Section 3 and Section 4, we investigate under
what conditions the e¢cient equilibrium is played by the population in the long run.
Section 5 concludes. The proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a …nite population consisting of N individuals. N is even, to avoid an un-
matched individual at any moment. Time runs in discrete steps (periods). In every
period, any individual in the population is sequentially anonymously matched to any
other individual in the population to play the symmetric two-player game G in Figure
1: So, in one period, an individual plays the game G to every other individual in the
population exactly once. In each of the games an individual earns payo¤ according to
the payo¤ matrix in Figure 1, and the relevant evolutionary …tness of the individual is
the average payo¤ earned in one period. Before the begin of the next period, all indi-
viduals update their strategies simultaneously and independently by imitating currently
the most successful strategy.
We focus on games with strictly positive payo¤s satisfying a > c;d > b;a > d; i.e.
games with two strict Nash equilibria, one of which, (A;A), payo¤ dominates the other
equilibrium, (B;B). Payo¤ dominance of (A;A) and the assumption that (B;B) is an
equilibrium implies a > d > b; i.e. a > b: If, additionally, (A;A) is dominated in risk by
(B;B) as de…ned by Harsanyi and Selten [12], then a¡c < d¡b: For games where this
inequality is satis…ed, moreover, 0 < a ¡ d < c ¡ b implies here c > b .
The underlying game G is preceded by a communication stage. Two matched individuals
send simultaneously to each other a message from a …nite set M with cardinality m:
Each player in a match observes the message sent by the other player. Then both players7
simultaneously choose an action in the underlying game G: We denote the game with a
communication stage by GM: The messages in GM are cheap talk because the identity
of the message that is sent in the communication stage does not a¤ect per se the payo¤s
players earn in the underlying game.
Each individual is programmed to play a particular strategy in GM: A strategy in GM is
a message sent in the communication stage, and a mapping f from the product set of the
messages sent and the messages received to the strategy set of G; f : M£M ! fA;Bg:
Individual’s strategy is his type. We restrict the set of feasible types to a subset X of
the set of all feasible types.
In general, we consider two classes of types - communicating and noncommunicating.
A noncommunicating type sends any available message with positive probability and
chooses a …xed action in the underlying game. We consider …rst uniform babbling
where all available messages are sent with equal probability. Later, restricting the
message set to two messages, we consider also a restriction where one message is sent
by the noncommunicating types with a lower probability than the other message.
A communicating type sends a unique message as a signal to play the e¢cient equilib-
rium. For any message available in the message set, there is one type who sends that
message in the communication stage. The communicating types also di¤er from the
noncommunicating types in the action choice in the underlying game. A communicat-
ing type chooses action A in the underlying game if the message he received coincides
with the message he sent, otherwise he chooses action B:
The population state is described by a vector z 2 Z ´ N jXj with components zx denoting
the number of individuals of type x 2 X in the population. zx ¸ 0 for all x 2 X and
P
x2X zx = N: An individual of type x earns in one period of the game GM a payo¤
¼x(z). It depends on the current population state z and on the individual’s type x, but
not on individual’s name. Let us denote by ¼(x;y) the payo¤ earned by type x; if he is










The payo¤ function ¼x(z) summarizes how well type x 2 X is performing in state z:
We now postulate a dynamic process on the set of population states z; derived from
individuals’ behavior.8
2.1 Imitation dynamics
We assume that the individual behavior is driven by imitation of types that currently
perform best in the population. We index by t the population state in period t: Denote
by W(zt) µ X the set of types who earn in period t the highest average payo¤s, W(zt) ´
argmaxy2X ¼y(zt):
The imitation dynamics is such that if zt;x > 0 and x 2 W(zt) then zt+1;x ¸ 0 otherwise
zt+1;x = 0: In other words, if there is a unique type in the population at time t which
achieves a maximal average payo¤ in the population; then it is the only type that will be
present in the population in time period t+1: If several types achieve maximal average
payo¤ in time t; then any population composition where all or at least one of these types
are present is achieved in time t + 1 with positive probability. We will not specify the
imitation dynamics in detail in this case. Later we show that the speci…cation does not
a¤ect our conclusions because nonmonomorphic states are never the long run outcome
of the imitation dynamics.
The imitation dynamics generates a Markov chain on the …nite state space Z and we
let P = (pzz0)z;z02Z denote the transition matrix where pzz0 is the probability that the
state z0 is reached from the initial state z via imitation dynamics:
2.2 Solution concept
We introduce now some concepts and results we use to solve for the long run equilibria
of our model.
De…nition 1 The vector ¸ = (¸1;:::;¸jZj), ¸i 2 [0;1] and
P
i¸i = 1 is a stationary
distribution over the states in Z of the process P if ¸P = ¸:
A state that is assigned probability 1 in a stationary distribution is called a stationary
state. Trivially, all monomorphic states where zx = N for some x 2 X are stationary
under the imitation dynamics.
In general, the Markov process derived from the imitation dynamics can have several
stationary distributions and the initial state of the population determines which sta-
tionary distribution will be reached in the long run. The intriguing observation in the
literature on stochastic evolutionary dynamics is that if the individuals’ behavior is per-
turbed by allowing mistakes or experimentation then the long run behavior does not
depend on the initial conditions.9
We take this approach to guarantee path independence of the long run outcomes and
perturb the process P in the following way. Each time period, an individual updates
his current type to a new type by imitating the currently most successful type(s) with
probability 1 ¡ "; and updates to any type with probability " > 0. Let this perturbed
dynamics be described by a transition matrix P " = (p"
zz0)z;z02Z: Now, p"
zz0 > 0 for any
z;z0: The Markov process associated with P " is irreducible. It is a standard result in
the theory of Markov processes3 that P " has a unique stationary distribution ¸
" being
i) stable: for any ¸ = (¸1;:::;¸jZj);¸i 2 [0;1] and
P
i¸i = 1; ¸Pt ! ¸" as t ! 1





z almost surely as T ! 1
Foster and Young [10] introduce the concept of stochastic stability.
De…nition 2 The stochastically stable distribution ¸
¤ of the process associated with the
transition matrix P "; is ¸
¤ = lim"!0¸
":
Ultimately, we look for the states that will be observed in the long run with positive
probability, which are the stochastically stable states.




To characterize the limit distribution ¸
¤ of the perturbed dynamics we apply the method
of directed graphs on the state space and mutation counting method by Freidlin and
Wentzell [11], and introduced into economics in KMR [13] and Young [26]. Now, we
introduce some preliminaries of the tools applied later.
De…nition 4 For z 2 Z; a z-tree T is a set of ordered pairs (z0;z00), z0;z00 2 Z; such
that 8zi 2 Z;zi 6= z; there is only one pair (z0;z00) 2 T such that z0 = zi, and from every
state x 2 Z; x 6= z; there is a sequence of pairs (z0;z1);(z1;z2);:::;(zk¡1;zk) such that
z0 = x and zk = z:
A z-tree is a tree on the state space Z with the root at the state z 2 Z; and a unique
directed path without cycles from any state z0 2 Z; z0 6= z, to the root z:
Denote by Tz the set of all z-trees: To every state z, we assign a measure of the transition
probability along all trees of this state. This number, denoted by q"
z; is the sum of
3A classical reference to introduction into theory of Markov processes is the text by Karlin and
Taylor [14].10
transition probabilities along all z-trees in Tz. The transition probability along a z-tree
is the product of the transition probabilities associated with the pairs of states creating







Individuals update their types independently, therefore this expression is a polynomial in
": For a tree T 2 Tz, we denote by cz(T) the lowest order of the polynomial summarizing
the cost of tree T, and by cz the order of a z¡tree with the lowest order polynomial,
i.e. cz = minT2Tz cz(T): Also, let az be the coe¢cient of the term "cz in a minimum cost
z-tree.
Freidlin and Wentzell [11] prove the following.
Lemma 5 Let be given a Markov chain with a set of states Z and transition probabilities
pzz0 for z;z0 2 Z, and assume that every state can be reached from any other state in








The following theorem (Theorem 1 in KMR [13], p. 42) utilizes the polynomial form of
q"
z to describe the set of stochastically stable states.
Theorem 6 The limit distribution ¸
¤ exists and is unique. In particular, ¸
¤
z = az P
x2Z ax;
z 2 Z; and the set of stochastically stable states is given by argminx2Z cx:
Stochastically stable states are the states with the lowest order in the polynomial q"
z.
We show that cz is the minimal number of mutations needed to construct a minimum
cost tree of state z:
First, let us consider a transition probability pzz0 between two states z;z0 2 Z under the
perturbed dynamics.




Proof. Denote by czz0 the minimal number of individuals that have to update their type
via mutation so that z0 can be reached from z under the perturbed imitation dynamics.
These are all the individuals of types present in the state z0 that would not be imitated




All individuals in the population update their type according to the perturbed imitation
dynamics independently, therefore any transition from state z to z0 that requires k
mutations will be realized with probability (1 ¡ ")
N¡k "k = (1¡"+:::+(¡1)N¡k"N¡k)"k:
Denote by Bzz0(k) the number of mutually exclusive events that require k mutations so11
that state z0 is reached from state z: Then, p"
zz0 =
PN
k=czz0 Bzz0(k)(1 ¡ ")
N¡k "k: The
leading term of p"
zz0 is of order czz0 with coe¢cient Bzz0(czz0):
The coe¢cient Bzz0(czz0) is the product of two combinatorial expressions, one quantifying
the number of times we can sample czz0 individuals from the population described by z so
that state z0 can be reached performing necessary mutations by the sampled individuals,
and another quantifying the number of times we can allocate these mutating individuals
to the types so that …nal state z0 is reached.
Consequently, q"
z as a product of transitions pz0z00 along a z-tree is polynomial in "
with the smallest power to the mutation probability " equal to the sum of mutations
needed to achieve transitions between pairs of states in some z-tree T; and so cz(T) =
P
(z0;z00)2T cz0z00: The lowest order of a z-tree T is the total mutation cost of this tree:
The state(s) with a tree that uses the smallest number of mutations among all minimum
cost trees are the stochastically stable states. In this way the search for the set of
stochastically stable states reduces to the search of states for which we can build a tree
using the smallest number of mutations to achieve transitions between the pairs of states
forming arcs of the tree.
We now prove two lemmas that simplify this task for our imitation dynamics. Both
proofs are based on a tree cutting procedure which is often used in the literature to pro-
vide counterexamples to minimal cost trees, see Young [26] and Levine and Pesendorfer
[18]. If we ”cut” a tree at a certain point by eliminating one arc, the set of nodes of the
tree is divided into two subsets, and the structure induced on each of these subsets by
the pairs of nodes as in the original tree is a tree as well. A new tree can now be created
by adding an arc from the root of the original tree to a new root of the new tree created
by this cutting procedure. The proofs can be found in Appendix 3.
Lemma 8 Denote the set of stationary states under the unperturbed dynamics P by F:
Then, z 2 SSS implies z 2 F:
According to this lemma, when looking for states with the cost of minimum cost tree
that is smallest among all states we may focus on trees constructed on the restricted set
of states F that are stationary under the unperturbed dynamics. A cost of transition
between any two states in F is given by the number of individuals that have to mutate
so that the transition takes place.
We can also eliminate from among the candidates for stochastically stable states those
stationary states which are not monomorphic. The following proposition states that
the mutation cost of a minimum cost tree for some state z 2 Z is minimized at a
monomorphic state. The proof is again based on a tree cutting procedure.12
Proposition 9 If z 2 Z is such that for some x 2 X, zx 2 (0;1); then there exists
z0 6= z; z0 2 Z so that cz0 < cz:
The least costly way to incorporate a stationary mixed population state into a mini-
mum cost tree of a monomorphic stationary state is to introduce su¢cient number of
mutations to achieve this mixed state from one of the monomorphic states, and then a
single mutation leads to another monomorphic state. Travelling back and forth between
monomorphic states via the mixed states is the cheapest way to incorporate the mixed
states into the minimum cost tree at an additional cost of one mutation.
Moreover, any monomorphic state tree has to include the same nodes corresponding to
the mixed stationary states (if any), hence these additional mutations costs add up to
the same number in any minimum cost tree of a monomorphic state. We can therefore
simplify the search for stochastically stable states by constructing minimum cost on
trees on the set of monomorphic states only.
3 Uniform babbling and a …nite number of messages
Let us now assume that there is a …nite number of messages, m ¸ 2: For each message,
there is one communicating type who sends this message in the communication stage,
and chooses the action corresponding to the e¢cient equilibrium after receiving this
message. Otherwise, the type chooses the action corresponding to the other strict Nash
equilibrium. So, a communicating type behaves as if the population members shared
information content of messages, and exactly the message he sends has the meaning
”let’s play the e¢cient equilibrium”.
There are two noncommunicating types, programmed to choose a …xed action, A or B,
in the coordination game in Figure 1. These noncommunicating type send each message
with equal probability 1
m: Therefore we call this form of ”noncommunication” uniform
babbling.
We show in this case that the set of outcomes implied by the stochastically stable states
is not always robust to the introduction of cheap talk. When there are su¢ciently many
messages in the message set, then the outcome of the Kandori, Mailath and Rob’s model
without communication, the play of the risk dominant equilibrium, does not coincide
with the outcome we derive, the play of the e¢cient equilibrium. The e¢ciency, however,
is not achieved if the message set is small. The size of the message set is measured relative
to a number that is derived from the payo¤ structure of the game. These results hold
under the assumption that the population size is large, as speci…ed later.13
The set of types X ´ fA;B;C1;:::;Cmg. The noncommunicating types are denoted by
the action they choose in the underlying game G as A and B; and the m communicating
types are denoted by Ci where index i denotes the i-th message in the set M. Let us
denote an arbitrary communicating state by M: The state of the world at any time is the
population composition z = (zA;zB;zC1;:::;zCm); where zx is the number of individuals
of type x 2 X: Z is the set of all feasible population states, Z = fz 2 N m+2j zA + zB +
Pm
i=1zCi = Ng. We refer to a monomorphic state with zx = N for some x 2 X as state
x. If x 2 fA;Bg; the state is a noncommunicating state, and if x 2 fC1;:::;Cmg, the
state is a communicating state.
When the population state is z; the payo¤ to the player type x 2 X is equal to:
¼A(z) =
"
a(zA ¡ 1) + bzB +
m X
k=1








czA + d(zB ¡ 1) +
m X
k=1








a + (m ¡ 1)c
m
zA +
b + (m ¡ 1)d
m








For illustration, we now …rst consider the stochastically stable states in populations
where the type set is restricted to two types, i.e. the dynamics operates on a face of the
state space allowing all player types in X.
To …nd the state with the minimal minimum cost tree under the imitation dynamics
when only two types are considered we have to identify which of the two monomorphic
states can be easier reached via mutations from the other monomorphic state.
For any two states x; y 2 X; let cxy be the number of mutations needed to reach state
y from state x under the perturbed imitation dynamics: cxy can be easily calculated as
the minimal k for 0 < k < N; such that ¼y(z(k)) ¸ ¼x(z(k)) where z(k) is a state such
that zy(k) = k and zx(k) = N ¡ k: It is the minimal number of individuals needed to
change type x to type y in a population originally composed only of type x player types
so that the type y is imitated by all players in the next period.
Two ”noncommunicating” types A and B : Kandori, Mailath and Rob [13] show
for the best response dynamics and uniform matching that if the population con-
sists only of noncommunicating player types A and B. The monomorphic state in
which all players play the risk dominant equilibrium strategy is the only stochasti-
cally stable state. For the class of games considered here, the same obtains under14
the imitation dynamics. We …nd that cAB = dN a¡c
a¡c+d¡be and cBA = dN d¡b
a¡c+d¡be;
so that cAB > cBA i¤ a¡c > d¡b: If a¡c < d¡b; (A;A) is the payo¤ dominant
equilibrium but it is dominated in risk by the equilibrium (B;B): In this case,
cAB < cBA. It follows that state B is the stochastically stable state rather than
state A when the payo¤ dominant equilibrium (A;A) is not risk dominant.
Two ”communicating” types M and M0 : In a population consisting of two com-
municating types, individuals always arrive at equilibrium outcomes. When two
individuals of the same type are matched, they coordinate on the payo¤ domi-
nant equilibrium, and earn payo¤ a: When two types using di¤erent messages are
matched, they earn payo¤ d < a. As soon as one communicating type is more likely
to be matched with an individual of his own type than with the other type, this
type earns a higher payo¤. So, cMM0 = cM0M = dN
2 e , and both communicating
types are stochastically stable.
The ”noncommunicating” type A and a ”communicating” type M : The tran-
sition costs between the states A and M are cAM = dN a¡c
a¡c+a¡be and cMA =
dN a¡b
a¡c+a¡be, so that cAM > cMA i¤ c < b: The message set size does not play
a role here. Individuals of type A and M earn the same payo¤, a; always when
matched their own type, and 1
m times when matched with the other type. The
payo¤s of type A and M di¤er in matches where they are matched together when
the noncommunicating type A sends a message that is not the message used by
the communicating type, what happens with probability 1 ¡ 1
m: Then they arrive
at a disequilibrium outcome. The stochastic stability of the noncommunicating
versus communicating type depends on who is punished at this disequilibrium
outcome. If c < b; then out of equilibrium choosing action B is relatively worse
than choosing action A: In this case, it is harder to disrupt the monomorphic state
A than the monomorphic state M: The communicating types are not stochasti-
cally stable, and their responsiveness to the messages exchanged in the presence
of types unconditionally choosing the action of the e¢cient equilibrium is harming
their survival chances. On the other hand, if c > b; choosing B is rewarded at the
disequilibrium outcome relatively to choosing A, and it is harder to disrupt the
monomorphic state M than the monomorphic state A:
The ”noncommunicating” type B and ”a communicating” type M : This leads
to a handshake model in the spirit of Robson’s model [20]. There is one type
who ignores the message sent and received in the communication stage, and al-15
ways plays the ine¢cient strategy. The other type conditions own behavior on
the messages, and plays the e¢cient strategy if receiving a proper message, the
one he sends. Robson assumes that the communicating types can recognize the
player type they are matched to by the message received, and hence play an ef-
…cient strategy only if matched to own type. Unlike in Robson’s model, in our
model the communicating player cannot distinguish the type of the individual
he is matched to with probability 1: Type B matched to his own type earns a
payo¤ d; while the communicating type matched to his own type earns a payo¤
a > d. When an individual of a communicating type is matched to an individual
of type B; m¡1
m times they receive the same payo¤ d and 1
m times the disequi-
librium payo¤s b and c, respectively: Hence, both the equilibrium premium of
choosing A; a ¡ d; and the disequilibrium premium of choosing A; b ¡ c; which
may be negative; will play a role at determining which type will be more successful





cBM = dN d¡b
m(a¡d)+2d¡b¡c +
m(a¡d)
m(a¡d)+2d¡b¡ce; where m(a ¡ d) + 2d ¡ b ¡ c > 0 for
any m > 1 as m > 1 > b+c¡2d
a¡d due to the assumption that (A;A) and (B;B) are
both Nash equilibria, i.e. b ¡ d < 0 < a ¡ c: Adding and substracting the term
m(a¡d)
m(a¡d)+2d¡b¡c in transition costs between state B and M does not a¤ect the set of
stochastically stable states if N is large enough. The role of the size of the message
set is evident from the dependence of transition costs between states M and B on
m: As the number of available messages increases, the mutation cost of transition
from the communicating state M to the state B converges to N ¡1 and vice versa
the cost of leaving the state B to state M can be made very ”cheap” in terms of
mutations, cMB > cBM , m > c¡b
a¡d: So, the communicating state will be stochas-
tically stable and the e¢cient equilibrium will be the outcome of the perturbed
imitation dynamics in the long run, when the mutation probability converges to
zero, if there are su¢ciently many messages in the message set. Moreover when
c < b; there are always su¢ciently many messages. The condition on the message
set size can be binding only if c > b:
As we have shown, some transition costs between the monomorphic states depend on
the number of messages. Hence, we may expect that also the minimum cost trees for
states on the set of all states will depend on m: Intuitively, increasing the message space
size makes the type B less successful in the presence of communicating player types.
The more messages has the type B to randomize from, the lower is the probability that
he ”hits” the message interpreted by the communicating player type as a signal to play16
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Figure 2: All R-trees on the set of nodes P,Q,R.
strategy A; i.e. the lower is the noise.
To …nd the minimum cost tree for each state, we can use the symmetry of the problem
with respect to the communicating states. The transition from or to any of the com-
municating states to or from any of the noncommunicating states does not depend on
the index of the communicating state. Thus we will …nd the minimum cost trees for
the state space consisting of three monomorphic states A, B, M where M is one of the
communicating monomorphic states and extend the resulting minimum cost trees by the
m ¡ 1 edges such that each edge starts in one (yet unconnected) communicating state
and ends either in another communicating state (in a way so that cycles do no arise),
or in the state A; or in the state B; depending whether cMM0; cMA or cMB; respectively,
is the smallest among these three transition costs. Due to the fact that the transition
costs involving the communicating states are independent of the name of the commu-
nicating state, we may construct many trees with the same cost that di¤er only in the
permutation of the order in which the communicating states are connected to the tree.
All such trees will have the same cost.
The extension procedure preserves the tree structure of the tree built on the state space
fA;B;Mg; and creates a tree at the state space with m communicating states connecting
them at minimal cost an existing tree. Consequently, it is a minimum cost tree.
There are three directed rooted trees on the state space consisting of three states, see
Figure 2. In this …gure, R is the state which is at the root of the tree, and P and Q;
are the remaining states.
From the payo¤ function ¼x(z) in the evolutionary game, we can calculate explicitly the
mutation costs of transition between any two monomorphic states:
² cAB = dN a¡c
a¡c+d¡b ¡ a¡d
a¡c+d¡be, cBA = dN d¡b
a¡c+d¡b + a¡d
a¡c+d¡be
² cMM0 = dN
2 e17
² cMA = dN a¡b
2a¡b¡ce and cAM = dN a¡c
2a¡b¡ce, where 2a ¡ b ¡ c > 0 as a ¡ c > 0 >
b¡a: The last inequality follows from the assumption that (A;A) payo¤ dominates
(B;B); i.e. a > d > b hence a > b:








where m(a ¡ d) + 2d ¡ b ¡ c > 0 for any m > 1 as m > 1 > b+c¡2d
a¡d due to the
assumption that (A;A) and (B;B) are both Nash equilibria, i.e. b¡d < 0 < a¡c:
Let c(x) be the cost of the minimum cost tree of a monomorphic state x 2 X; i.e. the
total number of mutations needed for transition along the minimum cost tree of the
state x: The comparisons of the transition costs between monomorphic states in terms
of mutations can be found in lemmas A1:1 to A1:7 in Appendix 1. We refer to these
lemmas in the proofs of Propositions 10, 11 and 12.
We concentrate here on the results that are not driven by a small population size and
asymmetries resulting in the matching protocol: in a population consisting of types x
and y; type y is more likely to meet type x than types x himself, but this di¤erence is of
order 1
N¡1 so that as N increases, the matching asymmetry resulting payo¤s diminish.






m(a¡b)+b¡cg ´ ^ N: For
any population size N ¸ ^ N , we consider two cases: c > b and c < b:
The …rst proposition uncovers the subclass of games where the result of KMR holds
even in the presence of the communication stage. In these games, communication is not
e¤ective in selecting the e¢cient outcome.
Proposition 10 Consider the class of games G where c > b: If the message set is
”small”, i.e. M consists of 2 6 m < c¡b
a¡d messages, and the noncommunicating players
babble uniformly, then the limit distribution ¸
¤ = (0;1;0;:::;0) where ¸
¤
z = 1 for z
such that zB = N: Hence, the state B is the unique state in the set of stochastically
stable states and the ine¢cient equilibrium play is the long run outcome of the perturbed
imitation dynamics.
Proof. The restriction on the message set size 2 6 m < c¡b
a¡d implies that the equilibrium
(A;A) is the payo¤ dominant equilibrium, but not the risk dominant equilibrium. For
c > b and m < c¡b
a¡d; the minimum cost trees of the monomorphic states have the
following costs, see Appendix 1: c(A) = cBA + mcMB; c(B) = cAM + mcMB; c(M) =
cAM + cBM + (m ¡ 1)mcMB: Now cMB < cBM; see (A1.1) in Appendix 1, therefore
c(B) < c(M): From m(a ¡ d) < c ¡ b and m ¸ 2 it follows that a ¡ c < d ¡ b: In18
this case, cAM < cBA because (a ¡ c)2 ¡ (d ¡ b)(a ¡ b) < 0; see (A1.5) in Appendix 1,
therefore c(B) < c(A):
The second proposition states when communication via cheap talk leads to the e¢cient
outcome in games for which the payo¤ dominant equilibrium is not risk dominant.
Proposition 11 Consider the class of games G where c > b: If the message set is
”large”, i.e. M consists of m > c¡b
a¡d messages, and the noncommunicating players babble
uniformly, then the limit distribution ¸






z 2 Z such that zx = N for x 2 fC1;:::;Cmg: Hence, all monomorphic communicating
states Ci; i = 1;2;:::;m; are in the set of stochastically stable states and the e¢cient
equilibrium play is the long run outcome of the perturbed imitation dynamics. Any of
the messages attains the meaning of signalling the e¢cient equilibrium with the same
probability 1
m:
Proof. The restriction on the message set size m > c¡b
a¡d allows games where (A;A) is a
payo¤ dominant and a risk dominant Nash equilibrium, or games where (A;A) is payo¤
dominant, but not risk dominant equilibrium. For c > b and m > c¡b
a¡d; the minimum
cost trees of the monomorphic states have the following costs, see Appendix 1: c(A) =
cBM+cMA+(m¡1)cMM; c(B) = minfcAB+cMA+(m¡1)cMM;cAM+cMB+(m¡1)cMMg;
c(M) = cAM +cBM +(m¡1)cMM: Now, cAM < cMA; see (A1.2) in Appendix 1, therefore
c(M) < c(A): Moreover cAM + cBM < cAB + cMA because cAM < cAB; see (A1.6) in
Appendix 1, cBM < cMA; see (A1.7) in Appendix 1, and cBM < cMB, see (A1.1) in
Appendix 1, therefore c(M) < c(B) .
Finally, the noisy environment drives out the communicating player types in games
where (A;A) is the payo¤ and risk dominant equilibrium and choosing action A is not
punished at the disequilibrium outcomes, i.e. b > c.
Proposition 12 Consider the class of games G where c < b: If the noncommunicating
players babble uniformly; then the limit distribution ¸
¤ = (1;0;:::;0) where ¸
¤
z = 1 for
z 2 Z such that zA = N. Hence, the state A is the unique state in the set of stochastically
stable states and the e¢cient equilibrium play is the long run outcome of the perturbed
imitation dynamics.
Proof. The restriction on the payo¤ structure of the game G; c < b; implies that (A;A)
is a payo¤ and risk dominant Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. For c < b; the
minimum cost trees of the monomorphic states have the following costs, see Appendix
1: c(A) = cBM + mcMA; c(B) = cAB + mcMA; c(M) = cAM + cBM + (m ¡ 1)cMA:19
It holds, cMA < cAM; see (A1.2) in Appendix 1, therefore c(A) < c(M): Moreover,
cAM + cBM < cAB + cMA as cAM < cAB; see (A1.6) in Appendix 1, and cBM < cMA, see
(A1.7) in Appendix 1, therefore c(M) < c(B):
We …nd that if c < b; any message set with m ¸ 2 is ”large enough” so that e¢cient
outcomes are connected to the stochastically stable states. If c > b , the outcome of
the stochastically stable states depends on the size of message space m. The relevant
bound on the message set depends on how does the coordination premium of the e¢-
cient equilibrium, a ¡ d; compare to the payo¤s the players achieve at a disequilibrium
outcome, c ¡ b. The more messages there are, the lower the coordination premium has
to be so that the e¢cient equilibrium is the long run outcome of the dynamics.
4 Nonuniform babbling with two messages
Now, there are two messages in the message set and the noncommunicating types are
not babbling ”uniformly”. They are more likely to send one of the available messages
than the other. This introduces some exogenous di¤erentiation into the message set.
The message that is sent less often by the noncommunicating types serves as a better
signal for a communicating player type to identify when he is matched to his own player
type. A limit case has been previously studies in the literature by Robson [20] who con-
siders that there is one message that is not sent by the noncommunicating types at all.
The communicating players can then use this message as a ”secret handshake” to recog-
nize each other, and coordinate always on the e¢cient equilibrium when playing to own
type. Robson …nds that the ”communicating” types fare always weakly better than any
noncommunicating type, and the e¢cient equilibrium is observed. Does this result ob-
tain even when communicating players are not sending an exclusive message, but rather
a message that is used with a low, but positive probability by the noncommunicating
type?
A message is more reliable if the probability with which it is sent by noncommunicating
types is lower. At one side of the modelling spectrum is Robson’s model where the
reliability of the mutant’s message is one.
We might expect that the presence of messages with high reliability leads to the e¢cient
outcome (A;A) in stochastically stable states - and this is indeed the case. Nevertheless,
we will show that it is not always the case that only the communicating types using
the more reliable message are stochastically stable. There is no selection for communi-
cating types when the payo¤ dominant equilibrium is risk dominant. And, when risk20
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Figure 3: All R-trees on the set of nodes P,Q,R,S.
dominance selects a di¤erent equilibrium than payo¤ dominance, the reliability of one
of the messages has to be high enough, so that the set of stochastically stable states no
longer contains all the communicating player types and only the type using the more
reliable message is stochastically stable. These observations are stated below in three
propositions.
Let us now denote the communicating player type using the more reliable message sent
by the noncommunicating types with probability p 2 [0; 1
2) by L; and the communicating
player type using the other message by H:
We will look for minimum cost trees for each monomorphic state x 2 X = fA;B;L;Hg:
There are sixteen directed rooted trees on the state space consisting of four states, see
Figure 3. In this …gure, R is the state which is at the root of the tree, and P;Q; and S
are the remaining three states in any order. We consider all combinations in trees (b)
and (c) and all permutations in tree (d); to generate all the trees.21
When the population state is z; the payo¤ to the player type x 2 X is equal to:
¼A(z) = [a(zA ¡ 1) + bzB + (ap + b(1 ¡ p))zL + (bp + a(1 ¡ p))zH]
1
N ¡ 1
¼B(z) = [czA + d(zB ¡ 1) + (cp + d(1 ¡ p))zL + (dp + c(1 ¡ p))zH]
1
N ¡ 1
¼L(z) = [(ap + c(1 ¡ p))zA + (bp + d(1 ¡ p))zB + a(zL ¡ 1) + dzH]
1
N ¡ 1




From the payo¤ function ¼x(z) in the evolutionary game, we can calculate explicitly the
mutation costs of transition between any two monomorphic states:
² cAB = dN a¡c
a¡c+d¡b ¡ a¡d
a¡c+d¡be, cBA = dN d¡b
a¡c+d¡b + a¡d
a¡c+d¡be
² cLH = cHL = dN
2 e
² cLA = cHA = dN a¡b
2a¡b¡ce and cAL = cAH = dN a¡c
2a¡b¡ce, where 2a ¡ b ¡ c > 0 as
a ¡ c > 0 > b ¡ a: The last inequality follows from the assumption that (A;A)
payo¤ dominates (B;B); i.e. a > d > b hence a > b:
² cLB = dN
a¡d+p(d¡c)
a¡d+p(2d¡b¡c)¡ a¡d




As the reliability of the message L increases to 1; i.e. p decreases to 0; cBL converges
to 0; i.e. it becomes very ”cheap” in terms of mutations to leave state B for state
L:
² cHB = dN
a¡c¡p(d¡c)
a¡c+d¡b¡p(2d¡b¡c) ¡ a¡d




a¡c+d¡b¡p(2d¡b¡c)e. As the reliability of the message L increases to 1; i.e. p de-
creases to 0;cBH converges to cBA and cHB converges to cAB.
c(x) is the cost of the minimum cost tree of a monomorphic state x 2 X; which it is
the total number of mutations needed for transition along the minimum cost tree of the
state x: The comparisons of the transition costs between monomorphic states in terms
of mutations can be found in Lemmas (A2:1) to (A1:10) in Appendix 2. We refer to
them in the Propositions 13, 14 and 15.
We concentrate here on the results that are not driven by a small population size and
asymmetries resulting in the matching protocol and assume in the remainder of this






(a¡c)(a¡d)¡p(c¡b)(a¡c+d¡b)g ´ ~ N:22
Proposition 13 Assume that the message set consists of two messages and the non-
communicating player types send one of the messages with probability p < 1
2: Consider
the class of games G where c > b: If (i) (A;A) is both risk and payo¤ dominant Nash
equilibrium of the underlying game G, or if (ii) (A;A) is payo¤ dominant and (B;B) is
a risk dominant Nash equilibrium of the underlying game G; and the reliability of the
message sent with probability p < 1
2 by the noncommunicating player types is low, i.e.
p >
d¡b¡(a¡c)














w = 1; for z;w 2 Z such that zL = N and wH = N: Hence, both states L and H
are in the set of stochastically stable states and the e¢cient equilibrium play is the long
run outcome of the perturbed imitation dynamics;
Proof. The minimum cost trees for states A;B;L;H have the following costs, see
Appendix 2 : c(L) = c(H) = cAL+cBL+cLH; c(A) = minfcLA+cBL+cHB;cBA+cLH +
cHBg; c(B) = minfcAB + cHA + cLH;cAH + cHB + cLHg:
Neither of the two candidates for minimum cost B-trees has the minimal cost. On one
hand, cAH+cHB+cLH > cAL+cBL+cLH because cHB > cLH; see (A2.2), and cLH > cBL;
see (A2.3); and on the other hand, cAB+cHA+cLH > cAL+cBL+cLH because cAB > cAL;
see (A2.5), cLH > cBL; see (A2.3), and cHA > cLH; see (A2.4). Hence, c(B) > c(L):
Also, neither of the two candidates for minimum cost A-tree has minimal cost. On one
hand, cBA+cLH +cHB > cAL+cBL+cLH because cBA > cBL; see (A2.6) and cLH > cAL;
see (A2.4) and cHB > cLH; see (A2.2); and on the other hand, cLA + cBL + cHB >
cAL + cBL + cLH because cLA > cAL see (A2.4) and cHB > cLH see (A2.2). Hence,
c(A) > c(L): The states with the minimal cost tree among all states are in this case the
states H and L:
Proposition 14 Assume that the message set consists of two messages and the non-
communicating player types send one of the messages with probability p < 1
2: Consider
the class of games G where c > b: If (A;A) is payo¤ dominant equilibrium and (B;B) is
risk dominant Nash equilibrium of the underlying game G; and the reliability of the
message sent with probability p < 1
2 by the noncommunicating player types is high, i.e.
p <
d¡b¡(a¡c)





z = 1 for z 2 Z
such that zL = N: Hence, then the state L is the unique state in the set of stochastically
stable states and the e¢cient equilibrium play is the long run outcome of the perturbed
imitation dynamics.
Proof. The minimum cost trees for states A;B;L;H have the following costs, see23
Appendix 2: c(L) = cHB +cAH +cBL; c(H) = cAL+cBL+cLH; c(A) = minfcLA+cBL+
cHB;cBA + cLH + cHBg; c(B) = minfcAB + cHA + cLH;cAH + cHB + cLHg:
Neither of the two candidates for minimum cost B-trees has minimal cost. On one hand,
cLA + cBL + cHB > cHB + cAH + cBL because cLA > cAH; see (A2.4); on other hand,
cBA+cLH +cHB > cHB +cAH +cBL because cBA > cBL; see (A2.6), and cLH > cAH; see
(A2.4).
Also, neither of the two candidates for minimum cost A-trees has the minimal cost. On
one hand, cAB+cHA+cLH > cAL+cBL+cLH because cAB > cAL; see (A2.5), cHA > cLH;
see (A2.4), and cLH > cBL; see (A2.3); and cAH +cHB +cLH > cHB +cAH +cBL because
cLH > cBL; see (A2.3).
Finally, c(L) < c(H) because cHB < cLH; see (A2.2). State L has the minimal cost tree
among all states.
Proposition 15 Assume that the message set consists of two messages and the non-
communicating player types send one of the messages with probability p < 1
2: Consider
the class of games G where b > c; then the limit distribution ¸
¤ = (1;0;:::;0) where
¸
¤
z = 1 for z 2 Z such that zA = N. Hence, the state A is the unique state in the set of
stochastically stable states and the e¢cient equilibrium play is the long run outcome of
the perturbed imitation dynamics.
Proof. The condition b > c implies that (A;A) is payo¤ and risk dominant Nash
equilibrium of the underlying game G: The minimum cost trees of the monomorphic
states have the following costs, see Appendix 2 : c(L) = c(H) = cAH + cBL + cLA;
c(A) = cLA + cBL + cHA; c(B) = cLA + cAB + cHA:
Now, cBL < cBA; see (A2.6) in Appendix 2; and cBA < cAB when (A;A) is a payo¤ and
risk dominant Nash equilibrium, hence c(A) < c(B). Also, cLA < cAL for b > c; hence
c(L) = c(H) > c(A): The minimal cost A-tree has the minimum cost of minimum trees
of all states.
We …nd that with two exogenously di¤erentiated messages , communication always leads
to e¢cient outcomes. If one of the messages is su¢ciently reliable, then in the long run,
we will observe with probability one that only individuals who use this message survive
the evolutionary pressures. A unique message is selected by the dynamics as a signal of
intention to play the e¢cient equilibrium.24
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the evolution of communication in a model where messages
have no exogenous meaning. The underlying game is a symmetric 2 £ 2 coordination
game and we assume that individuals of one population are anonymously and randomly
matched in a round robin fashion to play the game. Most of the models considering
evolution of communication via cheap talk avoid the own-population e¤ects by assuming
the roles to the players are assigned exogenously. Our assumption of single population
complements the information on the role of the message set size and riskiness of the
e¢cient equilibrium outcome to achieve e¢ciency via cheap talk communication.
We assume that there is a …nite message set and the communication is noisy. Before
the game playing stage, both players send simultaneously a message from a …nite set
of available messages. The noise is endogenously generated by allowing the presence
of individuals who randomize among all messages in the message set. All individuals
update their strategies simultaneously according to an imitation dynamics, imitating
the player type with the highest average payo¤.
We show that with uniform babbling, if risk dominance is not in con‡ict with payo¤
dominance, the e¢cient outcomes will be observed in the long run. When risk dominance
selects a di¤erent equilibrium than payo¤ dominance, and the noncommunicating players
are babbling uniformly sending any of the available messages with equal probability, then
the e¢cient outcome depends on the number of messages available in the message set,
i.e. on the level of noise generated by the noncommunicating player types. The higher
is the number of messages, the lower is the noise. If the message set is large enough,
m > a¡d
c¡b; the e¢cient equilibrium will be played in the long run, and any of the messages
may attain the meaning of signalling the e¢cient equilibrium in the long run. Here, a¡d
is the coordination premium of the e¢cient equilibrium, and c ¡b is the disequilibrium
premium from choosing the action corresponding to the risk dominant equilibrium. If
the message set is small, m < a¡d
c¡b; the risk dominant equilibrium will be observed in
the long run, and messages do not attain meaning.
In the …rst case, the e¢cient equilibrium is the outcome of the dynamics in the long run,
as suggested by Robson’s model without noise, and in the second case, the ine¢cient
equilibrium is the outcome of the dynamics in the long run, as suggested KMR’s model
without communication. We connect these two results by assigning to them a level of
noise in the population, given by the number of messages available to the noncommu-
nicating players. The more messages, the lower is the noise in the population.25
Also in the experimental literature, there is evidence collected that e¤ectivity of commu-
nication in coordination games depends on the payo¤ structure of the game. For example
Battalio, Samuelson and van Huyck [1] …nd that subjects are more likely to coordinate
on the e¢cient equilibrium in a 2x2 game if the coordination premium, compared to the
other equilibrium, is higher4.
Then we consider a message set containing only two messages and introduce exogenously
asymmetry into the message set. We assume that one of the messages is sent by the
noncommunicating player types with a lower probability than the other message. If the
messages are di¤erentiated in this way, e¢ciency is always achieved. If payo¤ domi-
nance does not con‡ict with risk dominance in selecting the e¢cient equilibrium in the
underlying game, the noncommunicating player type playing this equilibrium survives.
In case of a con‡ict between these equilibrium selection criteria, the e¢cient equilibrium
will be played in any case. If the probability with which one of the messages is sent
by the noncommunicating player types is small enough, then the asymmetry introduced
into the message set selects a unique communicating player type in the long run - the
player type using the message set infrequently by the noncommunicating types. In this
case, there is a unique message that attains meaning in the long run, and it is the
message assigned to the more reliable message. Otherwise, both communicating player
types will be observed in the long run, and any message can attain meaning in the long
run.
Robson and Vega-Redondo [21] show that the results of KMR are also sensitive to the
matching protocol. If the uniform random matching is replaced by a true random match-
ing, the payo¤ function of every strategy becomes a function of the realized matching.
They show that this dynamics converges relatively fast to a Pareto e¢cient equilibrium
rather than selecting the risk dominant equilibrium. They moreover extend this result,
the selection of e¢cient equilibrium, to the common interest games. The nature of in-
teraction in the population matters as well for the outcomes of the dynamic process.
Ellison [9] shows that with local interaction, the speed of convergence can be consid-
erably higher. These observations could be relevant for a model with cheap talk for
example when considering the spreading of ”di¤erent languages” in a population, i.e.
the assignment of meanings to messages in a game when interactions take place locally,
and may be considered to extend the present model.
4For more experimental studies on communication via cheap talk in coordination games, see e.g.
Burton, Loomes and Sefton [5], Charness [6], Clark, Kay and Sefton [7], Cooper et. al.[8], Rankin, van
Huyck and Battalio [19].26
6 Appendix 1: m messages and uniform babbling
The mutation costs of transition between any two monomorphic states, A;B;M and
M0; where M and M0 are two distinct communicating states, are as follows:
² cAB = dN a¡c
a¡c+d¡b ¡ a¡d
a¡c+d¡be, cBA = dN d¡b
a¡c+d¡b + a¡d
a¡c+d¡be:
² cMM0 = dN
2 e:
² cMA = dN a¡b
2a¡b¡ce, cAM = dN a¡c
2a¡b¡ce:








These transition costs are compared in the following lemmas.
Lemma A1.1: Suppose N >
2m(a¡d)
m(a¡d)¡(c¡b): If c < b; or c > b and m > c¡b
a¡d; then
cBM < cMM0 < cMB: If c > b and m < c¡b
a¡d; then cMB < cMM0 < cBM:





This reduces to N (c ¡ b ¡ m(a ¡ d)) < ¡2m(a ¡ d): Hence c > b and c¡b
a¡d > m implies
cMM0 < cBM; while c¡b
a¡d < m; and N >
2m(a¡d)
m(a¡d)¡(c¡b) implies cBM < cMM0: Moreover,
cBM = N ¡ cMB; hence cBM < cMM0 ) cMB > cMM0:
Lemma A1.2: cAM < cMM < cMA , c > b:
Proof. cAM < cMM , N a¡c
2a¡b¡c < N
2 : This reduces to 2(a ¡ c) < 2a ¡ b ¡ c: Moreover,
cMA = N ¡ cAM; i.e. cAM < cMM , cMM < cMA:
Lemma A1.3: Suppose N > 2d¡b¡c
d¡b : Then cAB < cMB and cBM < cBA:







This reduces to N (d ¡ b)(a¡d)(1¡m) < (a ¡ d)(2d¡b¡c)(1¡m); where a¡d > 0
and 1 ¡ m < 0:
Lemma A1.4: If b > c then cMA < cMB:
Proof. If b > c then cMA < cMM0 by Lemma (A1.2) and cMM0 < cMB by Lemma (A1.1).
Lemma A1.5: Suppose (a ¡ c)2 ¡ (d ¡ b)(a ¡ b) < 0: Then cAM < cBA:27
Proof. cBA < cAM , N((a ¡ c)2 ¡ (d ¡ b)(a ¡ b)) > (d ¡ b)(a ¡ b):
Lemma A1.6: Suppose N > 2a¡b¡c
a¡c : Then cAM < cAB and cBA < cMA:








This reduces to N(a ¡ c)(d ¡ a) < (d ¡ a)(2a ¡ b ¡ c) where d ¡ a < 0:
Lemma A1.7: Suppose N >
m(2a¡b¡c)
m(a¡b)+b¡c: Then cBM < cMA and cAM < cMB:
Proof. cBM < cMA , N d¡b
m(a¡d)+2d¡b¡c +
m(a¡d)
m(a¡d)+2d¡b¡c < N a¡b
2a¡b¡c:
This reduces to N ((d ¡ b)(a ¡ c) ¡ (a ¡ b)(d ¡ c) ¡ (a ¡ b)m(a ¡ d)) < ¡m(a¡d)(2a ¡ b ¡ c);
i.e. to
N ((a ¡ d)(c ¡ b) ¡ (a ¡ b)m(a ¡ d)) < ¡m(a ¡ d)(2a ¡ b ¡ c) where a ¡ d > 0; so
that the condition is equivalent to N ((a ¡ b)m ¡ (c ¡ b)) > m(2a ¡ b ¡ c): Similarly
to prove cAM < cMB:
We identify now minimum cost trees on the set of states A;B; and m replicas of the
communicating state M. First, we …nd the way to connect m ¡ 1 communicating
states at a minimum cost to a state A; B; or a communicating state M: Then we …nd
minimum cost tree on the set of three remaining states fA;B;Mg; where M is one of the
communicating states. This then forms a tree on the set of states A;B; and m replicas
of the communicating state M: Let c(x) denote the cost of such minimum cost x¡tree:
Lemma A1.8: Suppose that for any m; N >
m(a¡d)(2d¡b¡c)
m(a¡d)¡(c¡b) . (a) For c > b and m < c¡b
a¡d;
cMB < cMM < cMA; hence a minimum cost tree for any state x on the set of states
A; B and m replicas of the communicating state M will contain m¡1 arcs starting
in one of the m ¡ 1 communicating states other than M and ending in state B:
(b) For c > b and m > c¡b
a¡d; cMM < cMB; hence a minimum cost tree for any
state x on the set of states A; B and m replicas of the communicating state M
will contain m¡1 arcs starting in a one of the m¡1 communicating states other
than M and ending in another communicating state in such a way that cycles are
not created: (c) For c < b; cMA < cMM, and cMA < cMB; a minimum cost tree for
any state x on the set of states A; B and m replicas of the communicating state
M will contain m¡1 arcs starting in one of the m¡1 communicating states other
than M and ending in state A:
Proof. (a) If c > b then cMM0 < cMA; see (A1.2). Moreover, if m < c¡b
a¡d; cMB < cMM0;
see (A1.1), therefore cMB < cMM0 < cMA. (b) If c > b and m > c¡b
a¡d; cMM0 < cMA;28
see (A1.2), and cMM0 < cMB; see (A1.1). (c) For c < b; cMA < cMM0; see (A1.2), and
cMA < cMB; see (A1.4).
Denote by M ageneric element of the setof monomorphic communicatingstates fC1;:::;Cmg:
In the previous lemma, we determined the way m ¡ 1 of these states will be connected
to a minimum cost tree of any state as a root. Now we combine this information with
information in which way the remaining three states will form a tree to …nd a minimum
cost tree for each state on the set of monomorphic states A;B; and C1;:::;Cm:
6.1 Minimum cost A-tree on the set of monomorphic states
A;B; and C1;:::;Cm
There are three A¡trees on the set fA;B;Mg with costs cA
1 = cMA + cBA; cA
2 = cMA +
cBM; cA
3 = cBA + cMB:
Lemma A1.A: The cost of a minimum cost A-tree c(A) is as follows: (a) for c > b
and m < c¡b
a¡d; c(A) = mcMB + cBA; (b) for c > b and m > c¡b
a¡d; c(A) = cMA +
cBM + (m ¡ 1)cMM0; (c) for c < b; c(A) = mcMA + cBM:
Proof. (a) cA
1 > cA
3 because cMA > cMB; see A1.8, and cA
2 > cA
3 because cMA > cBA; see
A1.6, and cBM > cMB; see A1.x. Additional m ¡ 1 arcs each with cost cMB are added
by Lemma A1.8. (b) cA
3 > cA
1 because cMB > cMA; see A1.8, and cA
1 > cA
2 because
cBA > cBM; see A1.3. Additional m¡1 arcs with cost cMM0 are added by Lemma A1.8.
(c) cA
3 > cA
1 because cMB > cMA; see A1.8, and cA
1 > cA
2 because cBA > cBM see A1.3.
Additional m ¡ 1 arcs with cost cMA are added by Lemma A1.8.
6.2 Minimum cost B-tree on the set of monomorphic states
A;B; and C1;:::;Cm
There are three B¡trees on the set fA;B;Mg with costs cB
1 = cAB + cMA; cB
2 =
cAB + cMB; cB
3 = cAM + cMB:
Lemma A1.B: The cost of a minimum cost B-tree c(B) is as follows: (a) for c > b
and m < c¡b
a¡d; c(B) = cAM + mcMB; (b) for c > b and m > c¡b
a¡d; c(B) =
minfcB
1 + (m ¡ 1)cMM0;cB
3 + (m ¡ 1)cMM0g; (c) for c < b; c(B) = mcMA + cAB:
Proof. (a) cB
1 > cB
2 because cMA > cMB; see A1.8, and cB
2 > cB
3 because cAB > cAM;
see A1.6. Additional m ¡ 1 arcs each with cost cMB are added by Lemma A1.8. (b)29
cB
2 > cB
1 because cMB > cMA, see A1.8. Additional m¡1 arcs with cost cMM0 are added
by Lemma A1.8. (c) cB
2 > cB
1 because cMB > cMA; see A1.8, and cB
3 > cB
1 because
cMB > cAB; see A1.3, and cAM > cMA; see A1.2. Additional m ¡ 1 arcs with cost cMA
are added by Lemma A1.8.
6.3 Minimum cost M-tree on the set of monomorphic states
A;B; and C1;:::;Cm
There are three M¡trees on the set fA;B;Mg with costs cM
1 = cAM + cBA; cM
2 =
cAM + cBM; cM
3 = cAB + cBM:
Lemma A1.M: The cost of a minimum cost M-tree c(M) is as follows: (a) for c > b
and m < c¡b
a¡d; c(M) = cAM + cBM + (m ¡ 1)cMB; (b) for c > b and m > c¡b
a¡d;
c(M) = cAM +cBM +(m¡1)cMA; (c) for c < b; c(M) = cAM +cBM +(m¡1)cMM0:
Proof. cM
3 > cM
2 because cAB > cAM; see A1.6, and cM
1 > cM
2 because cBA > cBM; see
A1.3. The minimum cost trees then obtain by referring to Lemma A1.8.
7 Appendix 2: Two messages and nonuniform bab-
bling
The mutation costs of transition between any two monomorphic states A;B;L and H
are as follows:
² cAB = dN a¡c
a¡c+d¡b ¡ a¡d
a¡c+d¡be, cBA = dN d¡b
a¡c+d¡b + a¡d
a¡c+d¡be:
² cLH = cHL = dN
2 e:
² cLA = cHA = dN a¡b
2a¡b¡ce, cAL = cAH = dN a¡c
2a¡b¡ce.
² cLB = d
N(a¡d+p(d¡c))¡(a¡d)
a¡d+p(2d¡b¡c) e, cBL = d
Np(d¡b)+a¡d
a¡d+p(2d¡b¡c)e.
² cHB = d
N(a¡c¡p(d¡c))¡(a¡d)
a¡c+d¡b¡p(2d¡b¡c) e, cBH = d
N(1¡p)(d¡b)+a¡d
a¡c+d¡b¡p(2d¡b¡c)e.
For each monomorphic state x 2 X there are sixteen trees on the set of monomorphic
states fA;B;L;Hg; with state x as a root. Some of these trees have the same cost due
to the symmetries cLH = cHL, cLA = cHA; and cAL = cAH: We denote by ~ T(z) the set of
minimum cost trees of state z:
Transition costs between monomorphic states A; B; L and H are compared in the
following lemmas.30
Lemma A2.1: Suppose N > 2d¡b¡c
d¡b and p 2 [0;1=2): Then cBL < cBH < cBA and
cAB < cHB < cLB:





This reduces to (1 ¡ 2p)(a ¡ d)(c + b ¡ 2d + N(d ¡ b)) > 0:
cBH < cBA ,
N(1¡p)(d¡b)+a¡d
a¡c+d¡b¡p(2d¡b¡c) < N d¡b
a¡c+d¡b + a¡d
a¡c+d¡b:
This reduces to (2d ¡ b ¡ c)(a ¡ d) < N(a ¡ d)(d ¡ b):
Lemma A2.2: Suppose for any p 2 [0;1=2); N >
2(a¡d)
a¡c¡(d¡b)+p(c¡b): If a ¡ c > d ¡ b, or
a ¡ c < d ¡ b and p >
d¡b¡(a¡c)
c¡b ; then cBH < cHL < cHB, otherwise cHB < cHL <
cBH:





This reduces to 2(a ¡ d) < N(a ¡ c ¡ (d ¡ b) + p(c ¡ b)):
Lemma A2.3: Suppose N >
2(a¡d)
a¡d¡p(c¡b): If c > b; or c < b and p > a¡d
b¡c, then cBL <
cHL < cLB; otherwise cLB < cHL < cBL:





This reduces to N(a ¡ d ¡ p(c ¡ b)) < 2(a ¡ d): The comparison for cHL = N
2 follows
from cLB = N ¡ cBL:
Lemma A2.4: cAL < cHL < cLA , c > b:
Proof. cAL < cHL , N a¡c
2a¡b¡c < N
2 :
Lemma A2.5: Suppose N > 2a¡b¡c
a¡c : Then cAL < cAB and cBA < cLA:
Proof. cAL < cAB , N a¡c
2a¡b¡c < N a¡c
a¡c+d¡b ¡ a¡d
a¡c+d¡b:
This reduces to N(a ¡ c)(a ¡ d) > (a ¡ d)(2a ¡ b ¡ c); where a > d:
Lemma A2.6: Suppose N >
(a¡d)(2a¡b¡c)
((a¡c)(a¡d)¡p(c¡b)(a¡c+d¡b)): If b > c; then cAL < cBL and
cLB < cLA:




This reduces to N((a ¡ c)(a ¡ d) ¡ p(c ¡ b)(a ¡ c + d ¡ b)) > (a ¡ d)(2a ¡ b ¡ c):
Lemma A2.7: Suppose N > maxf2d¡b¡c
d¡b ; 2d¡b¡c
d¡b g: If b > c, then cHB > cLA:
Proof. By Lemma (A2.1) cHB > cAB, and by Lemma (A2.5), cAB > cAL. By Lemma
(A2.4), if b > c then cAL > cLA, hence cHB > cLA:31
7.1 Minimum cost A-tree on fA;B;L;Hg
There are sixteen A¡trees tA
i with the following costs cA
i ; i = 1;:::;16:
² cA




4 because cBL < cBA see (A2.6), therefore
tA
1 = 2 ~ T(A):
² cA




4 because cBL < cBA see (A2.6), therefore
tA
2 = 2 ~ T(A).
² cA












4 because cBH > cBL see (A2.1),
therefore tA
5 = 2 ~ T(A):
² cA




4 because cBH > cBL see (A2.1), therefore
tA
6 = 2 ~ T(A):
² cA
7 = cLA+cBA+cHB : cA
7 > cA
9 because cBA > cBL see (A2.6), therefore tA
7 = 2 ~ T(A):
² cA
8 = cHA+cBA+cLB : cA
8 > cA
7 because cLB > cHB see (A2.1), therefore tA
8 = 2 ~ T(A):
² cA
9 = cLA + cBL + cHB:
² cA
10 = cBA + cLH + cHB:
² cA
11 = cBA + cLB + cHL : cA
11 > cA
10 because cLB > cHB see (A2.1), therefore
tA
11 = 2 ~ T(A):
² cA
12 = cHA + cBH + cLB : cA
12 > cA
9 because cBH > cBL and cLB > cHB see (A2.1),
therefore tA
12 = 2 ~ T(A):
² cA
13 = cBA + cHB + cLB:
² cA
14 = cBL + cLA + cHA:
² cA
15 = cBH + cLA + cHA : cA
15 > cA
14 because cBH > cBL see (A2.1), therefore
tA
15 = 2 ~ T(A):
² cA
16 = cBA + cLA + cHA : cA
16 > cA
15 because cBA > cBH see (A2.1), therefore tA
16
= 2 ~ T(A):32
Now, for b > c, we …nd that cA
10 > cA
13 because cLH > cLB see (A2.3), therefore tA




14 because cLA < cLH see (A2.4), therefore tA
3 = 2 ~ T(A) and tA
4 = 2 ~ T(A) ; and
cA
13 > cA
11 because cHB > cHL see (A2.2), therefore tA
13 = 2 ~ T(A): Finally, cA
9 > cA
14 because
cHA < cHB see (A2.7), therefore tA
9 = 2 ~ T(A). We conclude that for b > c; c(A) = cA
14:
For c > b; cA
3 = cA
4 > cA
10 because cHA > cBA see (A2.5) and cBL > cHB as cLB >
cBL > cBH see (A2.3) and (A2.1), therefore tA
3 = 2 ~ T(A) and tA
4 = 2 ~ T(A): The two






7.2 Minimum cost B-tree on fA;B;L;Hg
There are sixteen B¡trees tB
i with the following costs cB
i ; i = 1;:::;16:
² cB
1 = cAB + cHA + cLA : if b < c; cB
1 > cB
3 because cLA > cLH see (A2.4), therefore
if b < c; tB
1 = 2 ~ T(B):
² cB
2 = cAB + cHA + cLB:
² cB
3 = cAB + cHA + cLH : cB
3 = cB
4 ; if b > c; cB
3 > cB
1 because cLA < cLH see (A2.4),
therefore if b > c; tB
3 = 2 ~ T(B):
² cB
4 = cAB + cHL + cLA : cB
3 = cB
4 ; if b > c, tB
4 = 2 ~ T(B):
² cB




11 because cLA < cLH see (A2.4), therefore
if b > c; tB
5 = 2 ~ T(B).
² cB
6 = cAL + cHB + cLH : cB
6 = cB
5 ; if b > c, tB
6 = 2 ~ T(B):
² cB




6 because cLB > cHB see (A2.1), therefore
tB
7 = 2 ~ T(B):
² cB
8 = cAH + cHL + cLB : cB
8 = cB
7 ; tB
8 = 2 ~ T(B):
² cB








11 = cAH +cHB +cLA : cB
11 > cB
5 because cLA > cLH see (A2.4), therefore if b < c,
tB
11 = 2 ~ T(B):
² cB
12 = cAL + cHA + cLB : cB
12 > cB
11 because cLB > cHB see (A2.1), therefore tB
12
= 2 ~ T(B).33
² cB
13 = cAB + cHL + cLB : cB
13 > cB
8 because cAB > cAH see (A2.5), therefore tB
13
= 2 ~ T(B):
² cB
14 = cAB + cHB + cLH : cB
14 > cB
5 because cAB > cAH see (A2.5), therefore tB
14
= 2 ~ T(B):
² cB
15 = cAB + cHB + cLB : cB
15 > cB
10 because cAB > cAH see (A2.5), therefore tB
15
= 2 ~ T(B):
² cB
16 = cAB + cHB + cLA : cB
16 > cB
11 because cAB > cAH see (A2.5), therefore tB
16
= 2 ~ T(B).





2 because cLA < cAL see (A2.4) and cAB < cHB see (A2.1), therefore tB
9 = 2 ~ T(B)
and tB
10 = 2 ~ T(B); and similarly cB
1 > cB
11 therefore tB
11 = 2 ~ T(B); and cB
2 > cB
1 because
cLB > cLA therefore tB
2 = 2 ~ T(B): Consequently, if b > c; ~ T(B) = ftB
1 g:
For b < c; the remaining candidate B-trees for a minimum cost tree of state B are either
trees tB
3 and tB
4 , or trees tB
5 and tB
6 : Finally, c(B) = minftB
3 ;tB
5 g
7.3 Minimum cost L-tree on fA;B;L;Hg
There are sixteen L¡trees tL
i with the following costs cL
i ; i = 1;:::;16:
² cL








3 = cHL + cAH + cBL : cL
3 = cL
4; if b > c; cL
3 > cL
6 because cHL > cHA see (A2.4),
therefore if b > c; tL
3 = 2 ~ T(L).
² cL
4 = cHL + cAL + cBL : cL
4 = cL
3, if b > c; tL
4 = 2 ~ T(L).
² cL
5 = cAL+cHA+cBH : cL
5 > cL
6 because cBL < cBH see (A2.1), therefore tL
5 = 2 ~ T(L):
² cL
6 = cBL + cAL + cHA : if b < c; cL
6 > cL
4 because cHA > cHL see (A2.4), therefore
if b < c; tL
6 = 2 ~ T(L):
² cL
7 = cAL+cBA+cHB : cL
7 > cL
2 because cBL < cBA see (A2.6), therefore tL
7 = 2 ~ T(L):
² cL




4 because cBL < cBA see (A2.6), therefore
tL
8 = 2 ~ T(L):34
² cL
9 = cHL + cAL + cBA : cL
9 = cL
8, therefore tL
9 = 2 ~ T(L):
² cL




4 because cBH > cBL see (A2.1), therefore
tL
10 = 2 ~ T(L):
² cL
11 = cHL + cAH + cBH : cL
11 = cL
10, therefore tL
11 = 2 ~ T(L).
² cL
12 = cHL + cAB + cBH : cL
12 > cL
13 because cBH > cBL see (A2.1), therefore tL
12
= 2 ~ T(L).
² cL
13 = cHL + cAB + cBL : cL
13 > cL
3 because cAB > cAL see (A2.5), therefore tL
13
= 2 ~ T(L)
² cL
14 = cBL + cAB + cHB : cL
14 > cL
2 because cAB > cAL see (A2.5), therefore tL
14
= 2 ~ T(L):
² cL
15 = cBL + cAB + cHA : cL
15 > cL
6 because cAB > cAL see (A2.5), therefore tL
15
= 2 ~ T(L):
² cL
16 = cAL + cHA + cBA : cL
16 > cL
5 because cBA > cBH see (A2.1), therefore tL
16
= 2 ~ T(L):
For b > c; cL
6 > cL
1 because cHB > cHA see (A2.7), therefore tL
1 = 2 ~ T(L) and tL
2 = 2 ~ T(L):
~ T(L) = ftL
6 g.





1 < c if
cHB < cHL see (A2.2). For a ¡ c > d ¡ b; and for a ¡ c < d ¡ b and p <
d¡b¡(a¡c)
c¡b ,
~ T(L) = ftL
1;tL
2g: For a ¡ c < d ¡ b and p >
d¡b¡(a¡c)
c¡b ; ~ T(L) = ftL
3;tL
4g:
7.4 Minimum cost H ¡ tree :
There are sixteen H¡trees tH
i with the following costs cH
i ; i = 1;:::;16:
² cH








3 = cAH + cBL + cLA:
² cH












9 because cBA > cBH see (A2.1), therefore
tH
6 = 2 ~ T(H):
² cH




9 , therefore tH
7 = 2 ~ T(H)
² cH




5 because cBH > cBL see (A2.1), therefore
tH
8 = 2 ~ T(H):
² cH




5 , therefore cH
9 = 2 ~ T(H):
² cH
10 = cAH + cBH + cLA : cH
10 > cH
3 because cBH > cBL see (A2.1), therefore tH
10
= 2 ~ T(H):
² cH
11 = cBH + cAB + cLH : cH
11 > cH
12 because cBH > cBL see (A2.1), therefore tH
11
= 2 ~ T(H):
² cH
12 = cBL + cAB + cLH : cH
12 > cH
5 because cAB > cAL see (A2.5), therefore tH
12
= 2 ~ T(H):
² cH
13 = cBH + cAB + cLB : cH
13 > cH
1 because cAB > cAL see (A2.5), therefore tH
13
= 2 ~ T(H):
² cH
14 = cBH + cAB + cLA : cH
14 > cH
10 because cAB > cAL see (A2.5), therefore tH
14
= 2 ~ T(H):
² cH
15 = cAH + cBA + cLB : cH
15 > cH
1 because cBA > cBH see (A2.1), therefore tH
15
= 2 ~ T(H):
² cH
16 = cAH +cBA +cLA : cH
16 > cH
3 because cBA > cBL (A2.6), therefore tH
16 = 2 ~ T(H):
For b > c; cH
4 = cH
5 > cH
3 because cLA < cLH see (A2.4), therefore tH
4 = 2 ~ T(H) and
tH
5 = 2 ~ T(H). Also, cH
1 = cH
2 > cH
3 , because cBH > cBL see (A2.1) and cLB > cLA see
(A2.6), therefore tH
1 = 2 ~ T(H); tH
2 = 2 ~ T(H). Finally, ~ T(H) = ftH
3 g if b > c:
For b < c; cH
1 = cH
2 > cH
3 because cLH < cLA see (A2.5), therefore tH
1 = 2 ~ T(H) and
tH
2 = 2 ~ T(H). And cH
3 > cH
4 because cLH < cLA see (A2.4), therefore tH
3 = 2 ~ T(H). Finally,
~ T(H) = ftH
4 ;tH
5 g if b < c:
8 Appendix 3
Lemma 8: We …rst need some notation and a way how to decompose mutation cost
of a tree. We work with a tree which is oriented to the root, i.e. every state di¤erent36
from the root has a unique successor and possibly several predecessors. For a tree T
on A; denote by LT ½ Z states that are only a start to an arc but not an end of an
arc in T: This is the set of leaves of the tree T: For a state z0; denote by succT(z0) the
unique state such that (z0;succT(z0)) 2 T and by predT(z0) a set of states that satisfy
predT(z0) = fy 2 Zjy = succk(x); k = 1;2:::; for x 2 LT such that there is ¹ k < 1
satisfying succ
¹ k(x) = z0g; where succk(x) is the successor function applied k-times in
sequence. If z0 2 LT; predT(z0) = ;:
If T is z-tree; for any z0 2 Z;z0 6= z; it can be written as T = TpredT(z0) [ TZjpredT(z0) [
f(z0;succT(z0)g; where TpredT(z0) is a z0-tree constrained to nodes being states in the set
predT(z0) such that for any (y;y0) 2 TpredT(z0) it holds (y;y0) 2 T, and TZjpredT(z0) is a
z-tree constrained to the nodes being states in the set Z but not in the set predT(z0)
such that for any (y;y0) 2 TZjpredT(z0) it holds (y;y0) 2 T:
Denote by c(T 0) the cost of some tree T 0; i.e. the sum of mutations needed to achieve
transitions from the leaves to the root between the state pairs forming the arcs of the
tree T0: Then for any z0 2 Z; the cost of tree T; denoted by c(T); can be decomposed as
c(T) = c(TpredT(z0))+c(TZjpredT(z0))+cz0succT(z0), where cz0succT(z0) is the cost of transition
from state z0 to its successor. We use this decomposition to prove Lemma 8.
Proof. Suppose z 2 SSS but z is not stationary under P. Then, there is a monomorphic
state z0 2 Z such that pzz0 > 0: This follows from the properties of the imitation
dynamics: if z is not stationary, then it is composed of at least two types x;y 2 X, zx > 0
and zy > 0; such that ¼x(z) ¸ ¼x0(z) for all x0 2 X with zx0 > 0; and ¼x(z) > ¼y(z):
The state z0 with z0
x = N is trivially a stationary state, and pzz0 > 0 by assumption
that any individual updates his own type to any currently best performing type with
positive probability. The cost of the minimum cost z¡tree T can be decomposed as
c(T) = c(TpredT(z0)) + c(TZjpredT(z0)) + cz0succT(z0) with cz0succT(z0) ¸ 1 because z0 is a
monomorphic state, hence any other state can be reached from it only via mutations:
Now consider a z0-tree T0 constructed on the state space Z such that T0 = TpredT(z0) [
TZjpredT(z0)[f(z;z0)g: Now, c(T 0) = c(TpredT(z0))+c(TZjpredT(z0))+czz0 with czz0 = 0 since
z is not stationary under the imitation dynamics and z0 is the state reached without
mutations from state z: So, we have shown that there is another state z0 such that
cz0 < cz; and a state that is not stationary cannot be in SSS:
Proposition 9:
Proof. Suppose z 2 SSS but z is not monomorphic. Then, there is some monomorphic
state z0 6= z; z0 2 Z such that pzz0 = 0. Hence czz0 = 0, and there are no mutations
needed to reach the state z0 from the state z: Let T be a minimum cost tree of state z:37
Then c(T) = c(TpredT(z0)) + c(TZjpredT(z0)) + cz0succT(z0): Since z0 is a monomorphic state,
cz0succT(z0) ¸ 1:
Now consider a z0-tree T0 constructed on the state space Z such that T0 = TpredT(z0) [
TZjpredT(z0)[f(z;z0)g: Now, c(T 0) = c(TpredT(z0))+c(TZjpredT(z0))+czz0 with czz0 = 0 since
z0 is reached with positive probability from z via imitation dynamics. So, we have shown
that there is another state z0 such that cz0 < cz; and a state that is not monomorphic
cannot be in SSS:
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